SOURCE OF POWER AND VALIDITY

According to Article 142 (2), the Supreme Court "shall have all and every power to impose any order on penalty for any contempt of itself" subject to the terms of any law adopted in this matter by Parliament. Article 129, on the other hand, states that the Supreme Court should be a court of record with all the powers of such a court, including the power to penalize for contempt.

A comparison of the two provisions reveals that, whereas the founding fathers believed that the powers under clause (2) of Article 142 could be subject to any law made by Parliament, there is no such restriction as far as Article 129 is concerned... this is a constitutional power that cannot be taken away or abridged in any way by statute.

The power to punish for contempt is a constitutional power vested in this court which cannot be abridged or taken away even by legislative enactment.

The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, was enacted by Parliament, and it established procedure and penalties.

The Act distinguishes between civil and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is defined as willful disobedience of a court order, whereas criminal contempt encompasses any act or publication that: scandalizes the court, influences any judicial action, or interferes with the administration of justice in any other way.

The SC in many cases has held that when appearing in person, there is no total licence to cast aspersions in order to scandalise the court in connection to judicial affairs. Motivated and calculated attempts to undermine the judiciary's image in the eyes of the public and impede the administration of justice must be resisted in order to preserve their dignity and the majesty of the law."

It emphasised that the objective for the contempt jurisdiction is to preserve the dignity of judicial forums.

While justifying its need and the manner to which it is used the judges have been careful while applying it and have been thoughtful and careful of its use. The SC is also of the opinion that “it is not a vengeful exercise, nor are incorrect words capable of lowering a judge's dignity on their own. These are frequently overlooked, but when a chronic litigator strives to justify his existence by hurling dirt at all and everyone, the court must intervene.”

While emphasising on the misuse of contempt of court act Punjab and Haryana High Court reiterated that "The punitive penalties of the Contempt of Courts Act must be enforced with caution, judicial restraint, and judiciousness." Their indiscriminate and unjustified use, particularly against public officers in the course of their official duties, tends to unnecessarily embarrass, humiliate, and demoralise them, adversely affecting the discharge of their public functions without enhancing the courts' dignity, respect, and image."

The Kerala High Court declared in Noordeen Mohmmad v. A.K. Gopalan, AIR 1886 Ker 301, that the Indian version of the law of contempt of court is a legitimate statute. Because the classification is based on intelligible differentia that distinguishes persons or things grouped together from those left out of the group, and the differentia has a rational relationship to the object thought to be achieved by the statute in question, the contempt of Courts Act does not violate the guarantee of equality or Article 14.

Following this standard in Harkchand v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1453. The contempt rule was found to be reasonable and did not violate Article 14.

The contempt legislation does not violate Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech and expression. The Supreme Court has held in a number of judgments that freedom of expression, including freedom of the press, is not absolute and that constraints may be imposed by the State-making law on any of the reasons listed in Article 19 of the Constitution (2). Because contempt of court is one of the grounds listed in Clause (2) of Article 19, if it amounts to contempt of court, limits on freedom of speech and expression may be imposed.

In C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta, AIR 1971 SC 1132, The Supreme Court ruled categorically that current legislation dealing to contempt of court imposes reasonable limits within the sense of Article 19(2), and consequently does not infringe Article 19(1)'s protection of freedom of speech and expression (a).

Contempt of the law does not violate Article 21, which provides that no one's life or personal liberty shall be taken away unless it is done in conformity with the legal system. The court in State of Bombay v. Mr. P., AIR 1959 Bom 182, made it clear that the current system for contempt proceedings is backed by the law. The procedure in contempt is statutory, according to Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. As a result, there is no way to argue that the contempt statute is in violation of Article 21. The method created by law in Article 21 incorporates the existing procedure recognised by the courts and the Constitution.